Feb
18
Joseph Farrell on the Metaphysics of Saint Maximos
February 18, 2007 |
In an excellent little book published by St. Tikhon’s Seminary Press (Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor, South Canan, Pennsylvania, 1989), Joseph Farrell advances a novel and intriguing interpretation of the metaphysics of St. Maximos the Confessor. Whereas the dominant paradigm tends to interpret his metaphysics as more closely aligned with those of St. Thomas Aquinas, Dr. Farrell finds in them a harbinger of St. Gregory Palamas. Although this interpretation is unusual, I found myself largely in agreement with the words of Bishop Kallistos (Ware), who writes in his introduction to the book that Dr. Farrell
possesses a penetrating and creative mind, and he is gifted with unusual powers of analysis and insight.
Certainly the crucial word here is “creative”, but one cannot help but admire Dr. Farrell’s ability to present his case with scholarly care and Christian charity.
According to Farrell, St. Maximos draws a metaphysical distinction between Person, Energy, and Essence, and, as Farrell puts it:
These categories are not mere conventions of speech for St. Maximus, but rather correspond to distinct metaphysical realities. They are not therefore each names for the same, absolutely simple “Something.” Thus, while God is simple, this simplicity is not to be understood along the lines of the definitional model of simplicity, where the term functions as a great metaphysical “equals” (=) sign.
As Farrell notes, St. Maximos’ blurring of the link between metaphysics and predication is marked by a notorious sloppiness in the use of the Neoplatonic distinction between “Being” and “Having”. In bringing about this break from the pagan metaphysics within which the terminology had its origins, St. Maximos really is closer to Palamas, whose own work was rather representative of what the Byzantine philosophy of his day was capable of. St. Thomas, by contrast, writing a full two generations before Gregory was even born, manages to present a brilliant little treatise on the distinction between being and essence that preserves the connection between metaphysics and predication while at the same time managing to captivate both friends and critics to this day.
Farrell puts Maximos’ analysis of free will into the context of the controversies with the Monotheletes. For them:
…free choice is dialectical and therefore must be confined to the historical arena…
For Maximos, by contrast, the human will achieves its deified aspect in Christ, which has the effect of ensuring that the saints in heaven will choose only the good for all eternity while maintaining their freedom. This is a fascinating maneuver on the part of Maximos, but it also illustrates a rather interesting maneuver on Farrell’s part. He notes that Maximos’ method and doctrine made possible the Council of Constantinople in 680:
It is the dogmatization of the Dynamic of Cyrillic Chalcedonianism, a dynamic [that] permits the use of christological terminology in a triadological context. It is thus possible to speak of a real distinction not only between the divine essence on the one hand and the divine energies on the other, but also the divine energies amongst themselves.
In the case of the early Ecumenical Councils what is not said is often as important as what is said. Farrell appears to think that in permitting certain forms of language and theological speculation the Council was at the same time dogmatizing them. In other words, Farrell interprets the Council as doing something that I have suggested ought not to be done: mandating a certain form of metaphysics. It seems unlikely to me that this is, in fact, what the Council was doing, particularly in light of the historical context of political rivalry and social upheaval in which the Council had its origins. As a method for disambiguating certain concepts and helping us to make some sense (some sense) of a very difficult theology, a variety of metaphysics can be very useful, but by itself it cannot settle such theological disputes once and for all. However, surely Farrell is right to see in the definitions of the Council the theological contributions of St. Maximos, since this serves to place the work of the Council in the broader context of the debate with the Monothelites, which was also a central concern of St. Maximos.
For Farrell, however, St. Maximos represents, in his doctrine of free choice among the saints in heaven, a genuine departure from the theological analysis of St. Augustine on the matter of free choice and predestination, and it is to this topic that I will turn in my next post in this thread.
Comments
8 Comments so far
“Whereas the dominant paradigm tends to interpret his metaphysics as more closely aligned with those of St. Thomas Aquinas, Dr. Farrell finds in them a harbinger of St. Gregory Palamas. Although this interpretation is unusual…”
The dominant paradigm is more out of ignorance of what St. Maximos’ metaphysics actually is. If you look at the modern scholarship regarding Maximos (Louth, Yannaras, Sherrard, Scienski), it’s almost unanimous (except for French Thomists like the strain of Fr. Garrigues which was pretty much crushed by folks like Christos Yannaras and Farrel himself), that Palamas stands identical with St. Maximos. The reality is, is that the West is behind and is having to slowly be brought up to speed. To a Byzantine, it would be completely unnatural and novel to draw a distinction between the metaphysics of Maximos and Palamas. Rather, what IS unusual, from our perspective, is the lineage that has been given to Thomas Aquinas’s interpreters with Maximos. They really have little in common.
“Certainly the crucial word here is “creative”…”
What is “creative,” is not Farrell’s interpretation of Maximos, which could only be applicable in relation to what the West has mistakenly understood, but rather Farrell himself. What makes Farrell “creative” is his knack and ability to tackle a theological question that the West is incapable of solving from her Augustinian commitments (Thomism, Molinism, Calvinism, or what have you). The thrust and intention of Farrell’s dissertation “Free Choice in Saint Maximos the Confessor” is to tackle a genuine theological question from a Christological perspective (compare such an analysis with say Garrgou Lagrange or Fr. William Most on predestination) that gives adequate satisfaction, not to do “scholarship,” which is more a by-product of the work coming from such a genius. Maximos the Confessor is used as THAT spring-board to solve a problem that has haunted the nights of so many Western thinkers on predestination. Think about it, why does it seem that the East is unconcerned about such discussions on the topic after Maximos (though at the same time, the reader must realize that the problem seemed to plaque her so much from Origen to Maximos, due to East’s own Origenistic commitments). From this context, the ecumenical councils are actually a long divorce from Origenism in the East and the Hellenism that underlies it.
Photios
Fr. Jones
Thank you very much for your comment. I agree with you completely that the “dominant paradigm” is mistaken. Although he didn’t use the phrase “dominant paradigm”, the suggestion that this view is in some sense “dominant” was not Farrell’s, but Bishop Kallistos’ in his introduction to the published version of the dissertation.
I suspect you are right that the West has some “catching up” to do. The metaphysics of Maximos and Palamas is deep and intriguing, and different in some crucial ways from Thomism.
I will be posting more on the book in a few days (I meant to do it yesterday, but you know how things are) and it has been my plan to discuss in greater detail Farrell’s argument that the problem of free choice is rooted in the distinction between essence and energies. It is a fascinating interpretation of the situation.
Dr. Carson,
No need to call me a “Fr” as I am a layman.
On a positive note, I believe you are catching on to what Farrell is doing here and largely how it influences my blog energeticprocession.com
I hope to continue further dialogue on this topic, especially as it relates to the Filioque. Though very much related to the question of Monotheletism and to the paradigms of Origenism, Farrell’s analysis and linking it up with the filioque in “Free Choice” is rather brief, and I think is intended as more a “light bulb” for future discussion. Such a discussion is reproduced in a 4 volume set he did for his graduate philosophy seminar titled “God History and Dialectic: The Two Europes and their theological and cultural impacts” which sadly, is unpublished with only students and a few close friends who have copies of this work. Where discussion proceeds, I can do my best to try and fill in those questions and blanks to my limited capacity. A good place to start (for the short version) is too look at my paper on Gregory of Nyssa and Eunomius on my blog which was heavily influenced by GHD and Farrell. As necessary reading, that least gives “something” for us to start from as background reading and move on accordingly. Any counterpart reading on my side would also be equally beneficial.
Thank you for taking the time to evaluate someone that I am rather partial to theologically and personally.
I also apologize for my harsh comment I made to you on Dr. Liccione’s blog. I guess I am rather “protective” of my friends, but it was not necessary.
Photios
I can’t see how Farrell places the discussion in the context of Monoenergism. That simply was the context in which the issues were discussed.
As to the real distinctin between energies, Thunberg also maintains it and his work has been around for decades. I think Thomists and Co. has simply forced Maximus into a round hole or ignored him because he didn’t fit. Consequently, Farrell and Palamas aren’t giving a novel read to Maximus as you can find the same read in lots of source long before Aquinas. And you can find similar scholarly analysis in Greek theological monographs long before Jugie was pelting Palamas with insults. I simply can’t take seriously based on textual evidence the idea that Palamas made up the distinction.
“[I]t has been my plan to discuss in greater detail Farrell’s argument that the problem of free choice is rooted in the distinction between essence and energies. It is a fascinating interpretation of the situation.”
I think he would say that the essence-energy distinction is important for that argument of free choice, but it is the Person-Nature distinction (where nature here is considered to be both the distinction of essence-energy) that really makes the pony run. The Natural will as “energy” and property of the nature doesn’t “will” anything, it presents objects of will to the Person, which is chosen from by the particular mode of willing. What is most fascinating for me is the tripart distinction of the will: the will as the natural faculty of will, the will as the personal mode of willing, AND the will as the object of will. Farrell believes that if any one of these is collapsed together with any other, determinism will crop up somewhere with peculiar ramifications for Trinitarian theology and Christology.
Photios
Photios
Thank you very much for your kind words, and my apologies for, apparently, confusing you with someone else (there is a Daniel Photios Jones who is an Orthodox priest in Delta, CO–I don’t really know why I assumed you were he, but there you have it).
I understand your depth of feeling for your friend, and I can’t say that I wouldn’t have said something similar myself if a remark like mine had been made about a friend of mine. If I may try to possibly redeem myself just a little in your eyes, I will say that my comment about Perry was not meant to be an insult, though I do confess that my words were not well chosen. I’ve read much of Perry’s stuff that’s available on the net, and he strikes me as someone in whom there is great promise, and I really did not mean to suggest otherwise. At any rate, I regret having been something of a cause of scandal, and I apologize to both of you. It was kind of you–and very charitable–to apologize to me first when I was the one who really started things. makarioi hoi eirênopoioi.
On a more technical note, I think you are quite right that it is the Person-Nature distinction that takes center stage in Farrell’s book; it seems to me, however, that the importance of that distinction is not entirely isolated from the essence-energies distinction, at least insofar as the overall course of Farrell’s argument is concerned. That is to say, I think Farrell does an excellent job of showing how these issues relate to one another in the overall historical context in which they developed.
I’ll have a look at the stuff you recommend this afternoon and evening, but perhaps you could start things off with some comments of your own on what you think of the connection to the Filioque that you mention; or if you think there is a better place to start, just jump right in wherever you like.
best
Scott
Scott,
Just as some background, I wrote that paper for Fr. David Balas who is a world renown expert on Gregory of Nyssa (and a good friend). Overall, he was well pleased by the paper, except that he believed I was too harsh on “Hellenism” in general. He says that he thinks that it would be nonsense to think that Gregory was not influenced by Plotinus or Philo. Certainly so! There is no doubt that of the three Cappadocian Fathers, Gregory of Nyssa is the most philosophical and Neoplatonic, and what I mean by that is where the other two (Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus) take hellenistic terms and gut them of there hellenstic conceptual content and plug them full of christian conceptual content, hence the term takes on a NEW christian meaning, Gregory of Nyssa is not as careful in doing so. But this is the real motivation behind my paper, because I believe of all the Greek Fathers, he is the most misunderstood by Western Europe (the Augustinian tradition broadly). I believe the encounter with Eunomius forced some recommitments in Triadological thinking in which Gregory becomes most hostile to pagan philsophical dialectic. What do I think is the overlap between predestination/monenergism and Triadology/Filioque? 1) The order in which we address theological questions: the ordo theologiae, and 2) What falls out of those commitments: the dialectical method vs. the apodictic method, a religion of reason vs. a religion which is demonstrative or observational (experiential).
Calvin: “How can the contingent affect the First Cause on which it utterly depends?”
Arius: “How can the Eternal be begotten?”
I use these “quotes” to state what I think portrays a common doctrinal paradigm.
The debates amongst the Carolingians on the Eucharist I think is also illustrative.
Photios
Is there a way to send you a private e-mail? I can’t find one.