Feb
17
Another Aristotelian Distinction Lost
February 17, 2007 | 7 Comments
One has to admire the proponents of I-957 in Seattle, which ties the legitimacy of marriage to actual procreation, if for no other reason than their willingness to use conceptual entailment as a consideration in the formation of policy, in spite of the fact that their attempt is a rather lame one intended not to actually bring logical consistency to legal policy but rather something quite different: to embarrass their opponents into abandoning legal restraints requiring marriage to be heterosexual-only. At the same time, one cannot help but smile at the conniptions the opponents of the proposal are having, since they could make the whole thing go away fairly easily if they wanted to, while at the same time putting an ironic twist into the ending by flummoxing the proponents of the initiative.
Whenever I teach Aristotelian metaphysics and introduce the notion of essential natures, some student will invariably bring up what he thinks is an obvious and final nail in the coffin of such views: particulars often fall far short of their putative essential natures in terms of their actualized capacities. For example, it is part of the essential nature of human beings to be rational and bipedal, but the sort of student I’m talking about appears to take great delight in point out that some people are actually born with handicaps, either mental or physical, that make it clear, at least to this putative student, that there can be no such things as “essential natures”. Stupid old Aristotle, why didn’t he think of that? It just goes to show you how easily 2400 years of the Western Intellectual Tradition can be toppled by a single act of 18 year-old intellectual illumination. But I digress. The difficulty with this objection is that it ignores (or probably just forgets, if it ever knew) the distinction between a set of capacities that define an essential nature and the physical working out of those capacities in a material being. For example, we may think of a recipe as something like an essential nature of something like a cake. If I want to see what, say, a German chocolate cake essentially is, I can turn to the recipe in the cookbook. There are the ingredients, the instructions, and maybe even a beautiful full color picture, all glistening with frosting and nuts and maybe with a slice tantalizingly taken out and placed on a plate…OK, Carson, get a grip on yourself. Anyway, we all know from sad experience that when we try to produce what is in the book we often fall far short (especially when the book is a very expensive one). It does not follow from this failure to produce what the recipe says that the recipe does not exist. The essential nature of the kind homo sapiens is rational and bipedal, but when that form is enmattered, the vicarious nature of matter can interfere with the way in which the essential nature gets manifested and you can find all sorts of variation in the material particular. This is, in fact, an important element in Aristotelian metaphysics: matter is the principle of individuation. If matter did not produce variety then all human beings would be perfectly identical. The unfortunate side of this is that some variation is not optimal when it comes to functionality.
Anyway, suppose we define “marriage” as a state in which procreation is the final cause. This means that having procreation as a purpose is a part of the essential nature of the state of marriage. Does it follow from this that any state in which there is no actual procreation fails to be a marriage? The answer is no. Only when there is no capacity for procreation would there fail to be a marriage. There need not be any actual procreation at all for the essential nature to be realized in a given enmattering. Those who propose limited marriage to heterosexual couples are proposing, in their own lame way, that homosexual marriages lack a capacity that heterosexual marriages do not. I say this is lame because, of course, one could easily quibble over how to define this capacity. Should we say, for example, that infertile people ought not to be allowed to marry? Well, if we are to be Aristotelians about this, we don’t need to say that, because we could always point out that male and female, taken as kinds, by definition have the capacity to be fertile as an element of their own essential natures, whether or not any particular instantiation of the kind does. But this does not remove the arbitrariness of granting legal recognition only to procreation-ready marriages.
This brings me back to the point with which I ended my first paragraph. This whole argument depends on the state recognizing certain forms of friendship. Now, conservatives find themselves in something of a predicament here, because they tend to favor the status quo and while they approve of heterosexual marriage they do not approve of homosexual marriage, and the reasons for both the approval and the disapproval tend to be rather arbitrary and ill-defined. For some (for example, Christians), the reasons may be religious, but it is no less arbitrary for the state to favor one form of friendship over another for religious reasons than to do so for purely aesthetic reasons. Non-religious conservatives have often suggested that the state has an interest in procreation, since it tends to work in favor of the continued existence of the state, but this reason will fail to defend heterosexual only marriage, since as long as some marriages are heterosexual then this goal will be available, and it is remarkably implausible to suggest that by recognizing homosexual marriage we diminish the likelihood that heterosexuals will continue to reproduce. The answer, it seems to me, lies in the state not recognizing any kind of marriage at all. I really don’t see that it is any of the state’s business to recognize my, or anyone else’s, marriage. Marriage, as such, is Sacramental, and need be recognized only by the Church. What should be at issue is not “marriage”, but some kind of contract between friends to live together under certain conditions of joint property. That sort of thing is already widely available in most states, and in fact it is often handled without state intervention. Ohio does not mandate recognition by employers of domestic-partner relationships, but Ohio University recognizes them anyway. In fact, I was on the Faculty Senate when they voted on it, and the faculty were practically falling all over themselves to make their support of the recognition clear, going so far as to vote to suspend the rules of procedure so as to bring the proposal for recognition to a vote three months earlier than would ordinarily have been possible. There were two people who tried to present arguments against the proposal, and they were ridiculed and literally shouted down. So it is implausible to suggest that such recognition will never come unless the state intervenes.
This sort of solution will flummox the proponents of I-957, I think, because they don’t want the state to bow out of “marriage” recognition entirely, they want to get domestic partnerships recognized as marriages. I may be wrong about this, but I myself don’t see anything about domestic partnerships that Christians ought to oppose, other than the whole sex-outside-of-Sacramental-marriage thing. But that is a problem not only with homosexual domestic partnerships but with heterosexuals who live together outside of matrimony. It’s not a “gay” problem in the first place, so it’s not a problem with gay domestic partnerships, and the state has no business regulating it.
Comments
7 Comments so far
What are the inherent implications for tax law? I really like the idea of the government bowing out of the marriage business, but what are the practical implications?
Thanks for the post.
Well, I’m not a tax law attorney, and I don’t even play one on TV, but my guess is that the tax laws are currently structured in such a way as to give incentives or disincentives to certain kinds of behavior over others (for example, high taxes on tobacco products are supposed to discourage smoking). It seems to me that if the government is to get out of the business of regulating friendships, then it ought not to give incentives or disincentives to disparate kinds of friendships or the private contractual agreements made between friends. For my part, I’ve always favored a low, flat tax anyway.
On an unrelated note, I’m suddenly struck by the strangeness of “contractual agreements made between friends”. One wonders why friends, as such, would need legal contracts to “regulate” such things, but of course the point is also partly to ensure things like survivor benefits and medical coverage of “partners”. So I suppose that, to the extent that tax law is still structured in such a way as to help fund things like Medicare, there will need to be allowances made for the fact that domestic partnerships are as much a burden on the taxpayer as are other married couples. But, as I’ve mentioned, I’m more on the less-taxation-the-better side of things.
You can see why I’m not an attorney. I only think of the non-practical parts.
So, when you say that the state should bow out of marriage altogether, do I rightly understand you to mean that the state would still recognize a variety of ‘contractual agreements made between friends,’ some of which will be between people whom we now regard as ‘married’?
If what you are proposing is, in effect, a distinction between state-recognized relationships which confer the kinds of legal benefits currently covered under ‘marriage’ and marriage as a Sacramental relationship, then I think you’d find quite a few ‘liberals’ to agree with you. At least, I think I would agree with you. That is, I see no non-religious reason why homosexual couples, for instance, should not be able to enjoy the same legal benefits that heterosexual couples enjoy. Yet I also recognize that homosexual couples can never engage in the Sacrament of marriage, nor in a less religious but still very ‘thickly’ normative institution of marriage — and I find most arguments to the contrary difficult to swallow. I admit that I think a community in which the vast majority agrees in its core understanding of an institution as central to human life as marriage is better than a community in which that institution is bitterly disputed. But I am under no illusions that the 21st century nation-state can be such a community. I appreciate the sentiment behind the complaint that marriage is what gay people want, but the various arguments that come in from various sides suggest to me that the only practical conclusion is that the state cannot properly judge the dispute(s) in question.
So, unless I’ve misunderstood you, I think I entirely agree with you — as someone who participates in a marriage that is definitely not Sacramental, despite being ‘normal’ in all other respects.
I’m not sure I see why the state would have to be involved in any way in the recognition of relationships, even heterosexual ones that happen also to be Sacramental marriages. The difficulty, of course, is that there are still some places where any kind of co-habitation other than that sanctioned by the state (usually restricted to heterosexual marriage) are not only denied access to the sorts of property agreements that are at stake but also are actively discriminated against. That too, obviously, is a form of state intervention that I would say needs to go.
The extent to which the state will have to get involved, either to enforce property law or to eliminate barriers to private individuals making contracts about the disposition of property, is something I know very little about, but I suspect that, over time, that involvement could diminish, if the proper structures were in place. On the other hand, the communists were also always promising that “once the proper structures are in place” the dictatorship of the proletariat could be removed, but it turned out that one of the structures they always wanted to have in place was the dictatorship of the “proletariat”, which always turned out to be the party elite. So I’m under no illusions about how quickly we can expect state power to be removed from the regulation of such things.
Don’t you think it is a huge step backwards for the state to stop recognizing natural family bonds in the way it structures it’s laws? This is where gay marriage is taking us. Your view is just a different way of getting us there. To remove the state from marriage eliminates the recognition of mothers and fathers as well. That makes every child a ward of the state. Is this a good thing? I know it fits you logical model very nicely but is it good for the country?
BTW, I don’t know why it is hard to argue that heterosexual couples will reproduce less if homosexual couples are recognized. Gay marriage is not about allowing gays to marry. Most gays don’t want long term commitments anyway. What you will see is a sharp reduction in all marriage. The institution will become disrespected and less used. That will lead to fewer children.
Hi Randy
As a conservative I think, as a matter of principle, that the state ought not to have this sort of power. You would think so too if people who thought differently than you were in control of the state and mandating, say, gay-only marriage. But of course I can’t require that everyone see the realities of state power form the enlightened position of conservatism.
As for procreation tailing off, I think you’re missing the point. I’m not advocating gay marriage at all. The Church will still regulate Sacramental marriage, as it should. I’m advocating that the state get out of the marriage-recognizing business altogether.
Now, there are two ways to show that procreation will fall off if the state begins to ignore property contracts between heterosexuals. One method would be to argue for it on a priori grounds, that is, try to show that it follows of logical necessity.
It manifestly does not follow by logical necessity that if the state ceases to recognize heterosexual marriage, procreation will fall off. There is nothing contained in those concepts that would lead to that conclusion.
The other way to argue for it would be a posteriori, on empirical grounds.
But again the argument fails, because there is no empirical evidence that this will happen. For one thing, marriage, as such, will still exist as a religious institution, and the people who believe in that form of marriage will continue to get married, in spite of your assertion to the contrary, precisely because they are religious, not because they want to stick it to gay people, and they will continue to reproduce whatever the debauched surrounding culture does. For another thing, even people who are not religious, not married, and have no respect for the sorts of values you are advocating mandating through state power, always have, are now, and will continue to have children anyway. You may find this hard to believe, but some people – - even debauched atheists – - actually enjoy having children for their own sake, and they will continue to do so whether they are married or not, whether they respect the institution of marriage or not, and whether the state smiles upon them or not. And for yet another thing, in some societies – - such as Europe – - where there is no gay marriage at all, procreation rates are dropping anyway, and in other cultures – - such as certain areas of Africa and southern Asia – - where the state maintains no control over property contracts of this kind, procreation rates are rising.
So I’m afraid you simply have not given any plausible reason for believing that procreation will fall off if the state decides to stop giving official sanction to heterosexual marriages.
Most gays don’t want long term commitments anyway.
That comment shows that you don’t really have a very good idea of what you’re talking about. There are of course some gay people who fit your description, just as there are some heterosexual people who do. But a very large number of gay people are already in long term committed relationships, and they want those relationships to be recognized by society, not least in the form of eligibility for the kinds of benefits that heterosexual marriages now have.
As for children, the state already recognizes parents that aren’t married, and grants guardian status without necessary regard for biological parentage. So I don’t know why it would make a tremendous difference if the state were not to recognize marriages. It certainly doesn’t follow that all children will become ‘wards of the state.’
What you need to do in order for your argument to go through is to show, on the basis of arguments that make no appeal to religion or to easily questionable metaphysical doctrines, that our society has clear grounds for prohibiting the recognition of relationships between homosexuals. Scott has shown that the arguments you have offered so far do not get you where you want to be. There might be some others, but I haven’t heard them.
As for the practicability of all of this, I’m even worse off than Scott claims to be. I haven’t got the slightest clue how any of this would work in a real, live legal system. But that’s just one more reason why I’m not a lawyer.