Jan
10
Natural Ends
January 10, 2007 |
In a recent post I described the Church’s traditional view of what I called the “causal structure of the world”. Some of what I had to say there has raised questions for some of my readers, who have asked how it is that one might motivate an argument in favor of such a metaphysics, particularly the notion of final causality. Many people may, intuitively, feel a certain amount of sympathy for such a metaphysics, or at the very least for a moral scheme grounded in something similar, but they may at the same time feel the pull of certain Neodarwinian arguments against essentialism, which would at the same time militate against the very metaphysics that would ground such a moral scheme. To put it more prosaically: there may be no such thing as “human nature” as such, and if there is no such thing as “human nature” as such, then any moral view that attempts to show that there is an end-based norm for human behavior will fail.
I will try to put forward the beginning of an answer to this worry, but a full-blown defense of the view that I find most attractive will need, obviously, much more detailed argument than I can give in a forum like this. Let me begin with a hypothetical argument against the view I am defending. One can easily imagine an anti-essentialist making the following sort of case (indeed, I draw here upon an argument that was actually put to me at one time by a former student):
Darwinian theory shows that species develop through the mechanisms of random mutation and natural selection, and in the case of human beings perhaps ‘cultural selection’ has played some role. Because the functions of the parts of animals (granting for the sake of argument that they have real functions, which not all biologists and metaphysicians of biology will concede) are the products of random genetic mutation and natural selection, with the individuals of a species inheriting genetic traits from their ancestors, what we have in a species is not the sort of determinate thing that the natural-law appeal to nature assumes they are. A species is, rather, a group of individuals with a common ancestry and a capacity, derived from their shared genetics, to produce offspring. What human beings share, then, is a range of genetically-determined dispositions to behave in certain ways, and not some essential nature which they can complete to a greater or lesser degree. Thus, what individual members of the human species seek by nature may differ from individual to individual and from population to population, and in the strictest sense the only criterion of membership in the human species is a sufficiently similar collection of traits. If, then, any moral theory can be grounded in what all human beings share, it will only be grounded in what we share accidentally, because there is nothing essential to the human species.
To paraphrase very briefly: different human beings have different preferences, that is, they seek out different things depending on their own sets of values. Biological science does not provide a framework to support the view that any one set of values is superior to any other. In particular, biology does not support the idea that there is any such thing as a human “essence”. So biology cannot support the view that there is anything common to all humans. So both in terms of human preferences and in terms of human biology there is nothing that can be held to be normatively the same for all and hence determinative of the end for man.
This kind of objection is grounded in a certain sort of assumption of its own, namely a reductionist sort of assumption that appears to hold that if we can render an explanation of some aspect of human existence in materialistic terms, as the adaptationist explanation of human phenotypes aims to explain why we exhibit the traits that we do, then this fact in itself renders otiose–and thereby disproves–competing explanations of the sort that I’m offering.
Let me start by addressing the notion of function. It is true that not all biologists or philosophers of biology mean the same thing when they speak of “function” in organisms, but there is certainly a theoretically neutral notion of function that seems hard to deny, one which says only that certain structures appear to have certain capacities (this has been called the notion of “service functions”). The eye, for example, responds to photons striking the retina and in that sense is capable, in conjunction with the visual cortex of the brain, of detecting light and color. We may say, in a limited way, that this is one of the “functions” of the eye, and as long as we make this claim very limited I don’t think that there are any biologists or even philosophers of biology that are going to worry too much about the use of the word “function”. The worry arises more often because of Aristotelians who want “function” to mean something like a “final cause” in the sense I described in my post of the other day. It would be possible to claim that that kind of worry borders on begging the question against the Aristotelian.
But a better answer goes this way. What is at stake, clearly, is not the question of whether certain structures have functions in some sense of the word “function.” Rather, the worry is over whether organisms as a whole have functions in the Aristotelian sense, the sense grounded in the notion of nature. Only if humans as such have a single nature can there be such a thing as a “final cause” of mankind.
Biologically speaking, I’m not so sure I would be as quick as some to dismiss the notion that there is such a thing as a single human nature. It is an objective fact of biology that humans cannot interbreed with other species, for example. In fact, on one view, this breeding barrier is the sufficient condition for counting as a species. As with everything else, however, there is a fair amount of controversy–at least among philosophers of biology–as to what the necessary and sufficient conditions for biological species might be. But it does not strike me as plausible to say that it is literally impossible to tell the difference between a human being and, say, a snake. When we look at a human and recognize it as such, is this nothing more than a social construct? If so, it would be grounded in some sort of similarity conditions: that thing over there seems to me to be sufficiently similar to me to count as the same kind of thing as I. I suppose that kind of view is logically possible, but I think that, given the wide latitude of organisms that are able to “recognize their own kind” compared to the relatively narrow latitude of organisms that are capable of social construction, it seems to me relatively implausible as an account of what it is we’re doing when we recognize a member of our own species.
At this point I don’t see what difference it makes where we locate “human nature”, that is, the “what-it-is-to-be-human”, whether in some set of phenotypic traits, some section of the genome, some set of dispositional properties, or what have you. We don’t need to be Aristotelian essentialists in order to be essentialists. Just so long as there is something that we can say is present in instantiations of human beings most of the time, then it seems to me that we are in a position to say that there is something that we can call a “human nature”.
Apart from the details of how one would go about establishing such a thing, however, I don’t think there’s much controversy in such a notion. To borrow an argument that Aristotle himself often used (see, for example, Metaphysics Gamma), we may note that even the most stalwart defender of materialistic reduction still acts as though there is a real difference between a human being and a dog. To put it another way: you don’t see many of these folks trying to have children with their dogs, even though they claim to “love” them. In short, the people who deny that there is such a thing as a human essence usually only make the denial because they have an impoverished notion of what sorts of things might be countable as essences. Or else they make the denial for purely ideological reasons.
Philosophically–historically, anyway–the prime candidate for what it is that separates human beings from other organisms has been our capacity for a certain kind of rational activity. I’m not all that sure what is supposed to be wrong with this candidate, but it is true to say that in recent times the idea that human beings are “rational animals” has come under relatively heavy skeptical fire. Sometimes the objection to it is rather banal: chimps, crows, dolphins, etc. are all very “intelligent” animals, so “intelligence” per se cannot count as the differentia of the human species. But there are more sophisticated objections: what, exactly, is rationality itself? Is it not a social construct in its own right? What reasons do we have for thinking of it as an objective feature of reality?
The nature of rationality is a very difficult topic. My own view, to put it bluntly, is that human rationality is constrained by things that are external to us, viz., the laws of logic and mathematics. These laws determine what is and what is not a valid inference. To the extent that our reasons are compatible with these laws, our reasons are good; otherwise they are bad. One builds from there. The building is, of course, difficult, but it can be done. For what I take to be a particularly good example of how the building should go, one may consult Hadley Arkes’ fine book, First Things: An Inquiry Into the First Principles of Morals and Justice (Princeton, 1986).
What the Neodarwinian usually wants is to understand why it is that Darwinian theory does not compel us in the materialist, nominalist, anti-essentialist direction. Indeed, can Neodarwinism be regarded as compatible with an essentialist view at all?
My own view is that all of science can only be acceptable in an anti-realist way, but that, too, is a very large topic for discussion. But since I am a global anti-realist about science, I am a fortiori an anti-realist about evolutionary theory. In my opinion, all Christians must be global anti-realists about science, as I’ve argued in most of my posts about science. But you don’t have to be a Christian to be an anti-realist about science. One of my colleagues, who specializes in philosophy of science and who is a militant atheist, has said that you’d have to be a moron to be a realist about science these days (I wish he would say what he really thinks one of these days). In short, I don’t think that evolutionary theory, either in its Darwinian or neo-synthesis form, compels us to either nominalism or anti-essentialism unless we presuppose materialist reductionism. If you make that a priori assumption then, sure, lots of things will follow that are not very congenial to the view I’m defending. Like Aristotle, however, I am an anti-reductionist.
There will be time in the coming weeks to debate this matter more deeply. It is a matter of some interest to me and, I suspect, to a few of my readers (well, to one of them at least). For the Christian, much hangs on this. If one is serious about morality, then one wants to know that one’s moral theory is well-grounded. This appears to be of interest even to the Humeans out there like Simon Blackburn. So the arguments need to be well-crafted, and the objections well met.
It is interesting to note that, on at least one account (mine), crafting the arguments and meeting the objections constitute a major part of our natural end, so it would be wrong to take this too lightly.
Comments
7 Comments so far
The opinion you cite in the blockquote concludes by saying that all is accidental, because nothing is essential. If the terms are defined, this opinion amounts to saying all derives its existence from another (accident) because there is no other.
More generally, the opinion confuses “coming to be by chance” and “a chance thing”. If a chicken scratches out a triangle by chance, it does not follow that the triangle has no nature or essential properties.
Pushed to further extremes, the opinion quoted just becomes simply ad hoc: is it merely accidental to human beings that they are animals? Was it possible for an incorporeal, spiritual bird to evolve? If not, isn’t this just because to have a body is essential to birds? Is a mouse only accidentally alive, or is a dead mouse absolutely the same thing?
And finally (I’ve spoken too long) what does this opinion prove beyond the fact that most natural things come to be by chance? (I agree with this, and I am a strict evolutionist, like most of the manual thomists). It does not follow from this that they came to be without direction, for chance both presupposes order in nature, and the order of all things under divine providence.
One last point: when you say that a Christian must be an anti-realist about science, which science do you mean? Geometry? Theology? Arithmetic and Logic? Politics or Statistics?
I have no problem at all being a realist about evolution and thomism. I am as certain as science allows that if one ran a movie camera backwards a few hundred thousand years, there would be a moment when he saw primates coming out of trees and becoming primative men. But to assert this changes not a single premise in any of the five ways: things still move, are caused, are contingent, have degrees of perfection, and are determined to things.
I mean the empirical sciences. In particular, I think that most practicing scientists presuppose both materialism and empiricism. I don’t think that a Christian can be either a materialist or an empiricist, though I do think that within the confines of the empirical sciences a methodological empiricism is certainly warranted. Anti-realism here means only that I accept the usefulness of scientific theories without taking a position on whether they are literally true or false. Bas Van Fraassen, a Roman Catholic who also specializes in the philosophy of science, has worked out a position that he calls “constructive empiricism”, which I suppose he thinks is compatible, somehow, with his religious beliefs, but it is clearly a kind of anti-realism.
With regards to being a realist about evolution, I think it might depend upon what you think realism commits you to. If you are a realist in the sense that you think that evolutionary theory can be literally true or false, then you have to ask yourself whether that theory commits you to saying that natural selection arose from purely materialistic sources–i.e., are you willing to commit yourself to the proposition that God did not create the universe with such forces as natural selection at work in it. An empiricist cannot endorse the notion that the universe is a created place, since such a proposition is outside the confines of the empiricist program. Hence the Christian cannot be an empiricist.
Theology, arithmetic, and logic are not empirical sciences, but I suppose one could be anti-realist about them as well; I just don’t think the Christian is committed to anti-realism in such cases. Politics is not a science in any sense, as far as I’m concerned.
(before I say anything, I’ve overjoyed to find another person who takes Aristotle and St. Thomas seriously, so even though I happen to disagree with somethings you say, I think we agree on all the principles and about 99.99% of things that are mentioned w/ regard to sciences.)
In one sense I agree, in other sense I don’t:
A Christian can certainly be an empiricist about empirical things, or things insofar as they are empirical. In this sense, it is true that the Empiricist, as such, cannot endorse the idea that the universe is a created place, but this is purely negative, in that it does not follow from the principles of his science. A grammarian, as grammarian, cannot conclude that the universe is a created place either. The fault of the Empiricist is that he takes the inability of his science to deal with spiritual causes as an indication that spiritual causes don’t exist. The inference is false: the Empiricist can’t establish the existence of mathematical things either.
If you take Empiricism as having to deny what is outside its principles, then I agree that a Christian cannot be an Empiricist; but if you take take empiricism as merely studying things in an empirical manner, then I see no necessity that a christian cannot be an Empiricist about things insofar as they are empirical. Empiricism is just a method, and there are many different methods that men need in order to understand reality. Empirical method, although it is of limited use, can be of some use- like the verification of miracles: i.e. one needs to know ehat medical science can explain in order to understand what it can’t explain.
by “of use” I mean useful for understanding. Empirical sciences like Archeology also can contribute to our knowledge of Scirptural things.
I don’t know whether you’ve seen it, but Pope Benedict XVI took up the question of human nature, as it relates to attaining peace, in his Message for the World Day of Peace 2007, entitled “The Human Person, the Heart of Peace.” His treatment is primarily concerned with morality and theology, but he grounds both in the inherent, ontological nature of man.
He builds on his reflections in last year’s Message, and also on his recent reflections on God’s Logos (His Word or Reason) being “at the beginning of everything.” He speaks of natural law as a “transcendent ‘grammar,’ that is to say the body of rules for individual action and the reciprocal relationships of persons in accordance with justice and solidarity, [which] is inscribed on human consciences, in which the wise plan of God is reflected” (n. 3).
He points out that if the existence of human nature is denied or reduced according to the limitations of certain ideologies, the very notion of human rights is jeopardized, and the human person is opened wide to oppression and violence:
“Today, however, peace is not only threatened by the conflict between reductive visions of man, in other words, between ideologies. It is also threatened by indifference as to what constitutes man’s true nature. Many of our contemporaries actually deny the existence of a specific human nature and thus open the door to the most extravagant interpretations of what essentially constitutes a human being. Here too clarity is necessary: a ‘weak’ vision of the person, which would leave room for every conception, even the most bizarre, only apparently favors peace. In reality, it hinders authentic dialogue and opens the way to authoritarian impositions, ultimately leaving the person defenseless and, as a result, easy prey to oppression and violence.” (n. 11)
He explains that human nature is not something we construct, but which we receive as a gift from the Creator. His starting point is the Genesis description that God created man “in his image and likeness,” which is the ground of human dignity and human rights.
He has for some time maintained that theology, which for the past several decades has been happy to yield creation to scientists and focus only on salvation, must get back to re-claiming God as the Creator and His creation as a fundamental part of His plan.
In this message he develops a delightful notion of “human ecology,” which appears to be his attempt to springboard from the better conceptions of ecology (interconnectedness with all creation, respect for all creation) to a recognition that man himself is part of that creation. He quotes Pope John Paul II:
“Not only has God given the earth to man, who must use it with respect for the original good purpose for which it was given to him, but man too is God’s gift to man. He must therefore respect the natural and moral structure with which he has been endowed” (Centesimus Annus, n. 38).
Finally, in addition to the fact of human nature’s givenness (something received), there is also the “task” of the human person as well. But a task is more than mere action, rather it is goal-directed activity. And the gift (human nature) determines the goal, and thus the task: “the task entrusted to human beings [is] to mature in the ability to love and to contribute to the progress of the world, renewing it in justice and in peace” (n. 2).
An interesting commentary on the message is at
What Does the Prayer Really Say? blog, December 12, 2006.
I goofed up the URL for Pope Benedict’s Message for the World Day of Peace 2007 above. The actual link is here.